Submission Summary:

• Submission details:
• Submission received: 26 May 2008, 05:01:15
• Processing time: 3 min 40 sec
• Submitted sample:
• File MD5: 0x2FD6560AE786D4B9086BB118BA7A4324
• File SHA-1: 0x7BF09F82B1A97DDEBC001ECB3193CE95E585E680
• Filesize: 1,748,538 bytes
• Alias: W32.Spybot.Worm [Symantec]

• Summary of the findings:

What's been found	Severity Level
Is protected with Themida in order to prevent the sample from being reverse-engineered. Themida protection can potentially be used by a threat to complicate the manual threat analysis (e.g. the sample would not run under the Virtual Machine).
A network-aware worm that uses known exploit(s) in order to replicate across vulnerable networks.
Bugtraq ID 9213: DameWare Mini Remote Control Server Pre-Authentication Buffer Overflow Vulnerability.
MS03-026: DCOM RPC Interface Buffer Overrun Vulnerability - replication across TCP 135/139/445/593 (common for Spybot, Randex, other IRC Bots).
MS04-012: DCOM RPC Overflow exploit - replication across TCP 135/139/445/593 (common for Blaster, Welchia, Spybot, Randex, other IRC Bots).
MS03-007: Microsoft IIS WebDAV Remote Compromise Vulnerability - Unchecked Buffer In Windows Component Could Cause Server Compromise.
MS04-011: LSASS Overflow exploit - replication across TCP 445 (common for Sasser, Bobax, Kibuv, Korgo, Gaobot, Spybot, Randex, other IRC Bots).
Capability to perform DoS attacks against other computers.
Capability to terminate Antivirus, Firewall and other security related processes.
Replication across networks by exploiting weakly restricted shares (common for Randex family of worms).
Communication with a remote IRC server.
Creates a startup registry entry.
Contains characteristics of an identified security risk.

Technical Details:

Possible Security Risk

• Attention! The following threat categories were identified:

Threat Category	Description
	A network-aware worm that attempts to replicate across the existing network(s)
	A malicious trojan horse or bot that may represent security risk for the compromised system and/or its network environment

File System Modifications

• The following file was created in the system:

#	Filename(s)	File Size	File Hash	Alias
1	[file and pathname of the sample #1] %System%\taskManager.exe	1,748,538 bytes	MD5: 0x2FD6560AE786D4B9086BB118BA7A4324 SHA-1: 0x7BF09F82B1A97DDEBC001ECB3193CE95E585E680	W32.Spybot.Worm [Symantec]

• Note:
• %System% is a variable that refers to the System folder. By default, this is C:\Windows\System (Windows 95/98/Me), C:\Winnt\System32 (Windows NT/2000), or C:\Windows\System32 (Windows XP).

Memory Modifications

• There were new processes created in the system:

Process Name	Process Filename	Main Module Size
taskManager.exe	%System%\taskmanager.exe	2,293,760 bytes
[filename of the sample #1]	[file and pathname of the sample #1]	2,293,760 bytes

Registry Modifications

• The following Registry Key was created:
• HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices

• The newly created Registry Values are:
• [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
• ivHost = "taskManager.exe"

so that taskManager.exe runs every time Windows starts

• [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices]
• ivHost = "taskManager.exe"

so that taskManager.exe runs every time Windows starts

• [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]
• ivHost = "taskManager.exe"

so that taskManager.exe runs every time Windows starts

• The following Registry Values were modified:
• [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Ole]
• EnableDCOM = "N"
• [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa]
• restrictanonymous = 0x00000001
• [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa]
• restrictanonymous = 0x00000001

Other details

• To mark the presence in the system, the following Mutex object was created:
• fiodh

• The following ports were open in the system:

• The following Host Name was requested from a host database:
• firefly.no.eu.netgamers.org

• There was registered attempt to establish connection with the remote host. The connection details are:

Outbound traffic (potentially malicious)

• Attention! There was a new connection established with a remote IRC Server. The generated outbound IRC traffic is provided below:

Heuristics Analysis

• Heuristically identified capability to terminate the following security related processes:

• Heuristically identified capability of spreading across the following weakly restricted network shares:

• The network replication uses a dictionary attack by probing credentials from the following list: